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THE NOSE KNOWS: ENCOUNTERING THE CANINE IN BISCLAVRET 
 
Alison Langdon 
 
 
A dog is in general sagacious, but particularly with respect 
to his master; for when he has for some time lost him in a 
crowd, he depends more upon his nose than upon his eyes; 
and, in endeavouring to find him, he first looks about, and 
then applies his nose, for greater certainty, to his clothes, 
as if nature had placed all the powers of infallibility in that 
feature. 
—Gerald of Wales, Journey Through Wales 
 
The nose symbolizes discernment, whereby we elect virtue 
and reject sin. 
  —Gregory the Great, Book of Pastoral Rule 
 
For much of literary history, scholars have tended to focus on the 
symbolic valence of animals, to read their behavior and characteristics as 
representative of explicitly human interests and concerns. In the past 
medievalists have perhaps been even more prone to this, given that many 
of our sources providing descriptions of animal behavior, such as 
bestiaries, similarly emphasize the metaphorical or allegorical over the 
ethological.
1
 Thus when we read something like Bisclavret, Marie de 
France’s twelfth-century Anglo-Norman lai, scholars frequently discuss 
its werewolf protagonist as a foil for his much more beastly if wholly 
human wife. Michelle Freeman, for example, concludes that the 
werewolf’s wife “devour[s] the human being who was her husband, 
having made him, as well as her lover, prey to her own ambitions and 
pride. In this sense, the bisclavret’s Lady turns out to be the real 
werewolf, or garvalf, of the story” (294). Others read Marie’s werewolf 
as a metaphor for taming the beast within. Matilda Tomaryn Bruckner 
sees Bisclavret’s fundamental conflict as the need to learn to “control the 
beast with his human ‘entente e sen [understanding and intelligence]’” 
(259), while Robert Hanning and Joan Ferrante describe the lai as a 
whole as “a parable about the forces of bestiality that exist within human 
nature,” one that is “concerned with the human capacity to manifest 
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nobility even under the most trying conditions, and thus to transcend the 
animal part of our nature and garner the hard-won benefits of 
civilization” (101). 
In recent years work in critical animal studies has begun to reverse 
this trend by critiquing traditional humanist scholarship and, as Karl 
Steel explains, by “stress[ing] that the categories ‘human’ and ‘animal,’ 
as well as the assumption of any absolute limit between human and 
animals, must be radically rethought . . . [and] that the category ‘human’ 
is best understood by examining its dependent relation on the category 
‘animal’” (4). For scholars such as Steel, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, Dorothy 
Yamamoto, Marijane Osborn, Susan Crane, and others, the rise of critical 
animal theory has led to new readings of animals in medieval texts as 
living creatures rather than figurative representations of human 
experience and values. Taking such an approach to Marie’s lai, then, one 
must consider Bisclavret not only as man but as animal, acknowledging 
the significance of canine quiddity. 
Indeed, all of the characteristics scholars have given as evidence of 
Bisclavret’s enduring inner humanity characterize another animal as 
well—the dog. This is a connection that Marie’s medieval audience 
would have recognized, for alongside the highly symbolic interpretations 
of animals in the Middle Ages there are instances of a much more 
empirical awareness and understanding of the animals medieval people 
encountered in their daily lives, particularly concerning dogs. I am 
struck, for example, by Chaucer’s highly realistic description of the 
whelp’s submissive stance in The Book of the Duchess2 and by numerous 
observations in Bartholomaeus Anglicus’ De propietatubus rerum that 
any modern trainer would recognize as indicative of intimate familiarity 
with actual dog perception and behavior.
3
  
I am not the first to observe the doglike qualities of Marie’s 
werewolf. As early as 1979 Phillipe Ménard notes that Marie “en fait un 
animal doux et bienveillant, une sorte de chien-loup qui baise le pied du 
roi, couche aux pieds de son lit et lui porte une évidente affection” 
[“makes him a gentle and benevolent animal, a kind of dog-wolf that 
kisses the feet of the king, sleeps at the foot of his bed and bears him 
evident affection”] (177). More recently Crane observes some of the 
same dog-like aspects I discuss here, though like Ménard she does not 
explore the significance of Bisclavret qua dog in depth.
4
 Pushing this 
observation further, I suggest that the wolf’s portrayal in Marie’s lai 
might in fact reflect medieval understanding of canine behavior,
5
 giving 
new insight into one of the tale’s more perplexing moments: the peculiar 
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fate of a treacherous wife. Part of the answer, I argue, is that while 
medieval people would not have known the physiology of animal 
cognition, they were aware of the seemingly preternatural ability of dogs 
to judge correctly emotions and intentions that are invisible to human 
senses. 
This is the story of Marie’s lai in brief: the wife of a fine and noble 
knight is distressed by her husband’s habitual disappearance for several 
days each week, and after much cajoling and wheedling with 
reassurances that she will love him no matter what, she draws out the 
knight’s reluctant revelation that he becomes a werewolf. When his wife 
pressures him to reveal the secret of his transformation, he again 
reluctantly informs her that he must have his human clothes in order to 
return to human shape. Still more pressure leads him to reveal the hiding 
place where he keeps his clothing when in wolf form. The wife, horrified, 
promptly turns to another knight who has long declared his love for her, 
tells him that she returns his love, and persuades him to help her steal 
Bisclavret’s clothing, trapping him in his wolf form. A year later, the 
king and his hunting party come upon the wolf in the forest and marvel at 
its noble and courteous behavior. The wolf returns with the king and 
becomes a valued member of his court, where all are amazed at its gentle 
manners. Thus, when the knight who assisted the wife’s treachery 
appears at court and the wolf lunges at him in a rage, the court assumes 
that the wolf must be justified in some way. Similarly, when the wife 
appears at court the wolf also attacks her, this time biting off her nose. 
The king, convinced there is a reason for the beast’s hatred, tortures the 
wife until she confesses and reveals where she has hidden her erstwhile 
husband’s clothing. Bisclavret’s clothes are returned to him and the 
werewolf is restored to human form. The wife and her lover are punished 
with exile, and the wife’s disfiguration is passed down through many of 
her female descendants. 
Readers are often left baffled by this bizarre retribution: why bite 
off the wife’s nose, specifically? This peculiar detail is in fact unique to 
Marie’s version of the story. In Biclarel, its nearest French analogue, the 
wife’s disfigurement is not specified; we are simply told the werewolf 
“Grant col li fiert an mi la face, / Par po le vis ne li efface” [gave her a 
great blow to the middle of her face / and nearly mutilated her face] (373-
74). Though critics have offered a range of interpretations for the wife’s 
punishment in Marie’s lai, approaching the significance of noselessness 
from a dog’s perspective may deepen our understanding of the poem’s 
central concerns. In Bisclavret, the wife’s noselessness is a marker of 
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human failure of perception through her inability to recognize the truth of 
her husband’s character. It also signifies our overreliance on forms of 
communication that are much more susceptible to distortion and 
misrepresentation. Mouths can lie, ears and eyes can be deceived, but the 
nose cannot. 
Admittedly, a werewolf is not a dog; yet as we shall see, there are 
remarkable parallels between Marie’s characterization of the wolf 
Bisclavret and medieval descriptions of dog behavior, far more so than 
depictions of wolves. In medieval bestiaries and encyclopedic texts, 
wolves are primarily characterized by their ravenous nature and 
rapacious greed. The Aberdeen Bestiary declares that wolves, “maddened 
by greed, [. . . ] kill whatever they find. . . . Wolves get their name from 
their rapacity. . . . The wolf is a rapacious beast and craves blood” (fol. 
16v-17v). The bestiary traditions also draw multiple parallels between 
wolves and the devil: 
 
The Devil has the nature of a wolf; he always looks with an evil 
eye upon mankind and continually circles the sheepfold of the 
faithful of the Church, to ruin and destroy their souls. . . . The fact 
that its strength lies in its forequarters and not in its hindquarters 
also signifies the Devil, who was formerly the angel of light in 
heaven, but has now been made an apostate below. The wolf's 
eyes shine in the night like lamps because the works of the Devil 
seem beautiful and wholesome to blind and foolish men. . . . The 
fact that the wolf cannot turn his neck without turning the whole 
of his body signifies that the Devil never turns towards the 
correction of penitence. (Aberdeen Bestiary, fol. 16v-17v) 
 
Surveying the depiction of wolves across multiple medieval literary 
genres, Aleksander Pluskowski describes the archetypal wolf as 
“characterized by unbridled cruelty, bestial ferocity as well as literal-
mindedness and gullibility, driven by ravenous hunger” (132). In short, 
wolves are presented as supremely nasty, vicious creatures, and one 
might assume that a werewolf would exhibit similar qualities.  
Initially, after clarifying the Breton and Norman words for 
werewolf (bisclavret and garvalf respectively), Marie characterizes 
werewolves in much the same way that bestiaries do wolves: 
 
Garualf, c[eo] est beste salvage:  
Tant cum il est en cele rage,  
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Hummes devure, grant mal fait,  
Es granz fore[z] converse e vait. (9-12) 
 
The werewolf is a wild beast: 
when it is in that frenzy,  
 it devours people and does great harm. 
It lives in and roams the great forests.
6
  
 
However, Marie follows this statement by implying a distinction between 
the rapacious garvalf and the bisclavret of her lai, who exhibits none of 
the behaviors she has just described: “Cest afere les ore ester; / Del 
bisclaveret [vus] voil cunter” [“Now I let this matter be; / I want to tell 
you about the bisclavret”] (13-14).  In fact, Bisclavret’s behavior while in 
canine form far more closely corresponds to the primary characteristics 
of dogs in the bestiary tradition.
7
  
Even as they acknowledge inherent similarities between dogs and 
their wild cousins, medieval writers draw a sharp distinction between 
dogs and wolves, largely stripping those similarities of their negative 
valences and attributing positive ones when describing dogs. This is 
succinctly illustrated by Gerald of Wales, who explains that “a dog’s 
tongue has healing power, but that of a wolf can cause death. If a dog is 
hurt, it can heal itself by licking the places, but a wolf’s tongue only 
infects the wounds” (130). Where wolves are cunning, dogs are 
intelligent and discerning; where wolves are rapacious, bloodthirsty man-
eaters, dogs are singular in their loyalty and devotion to humans. 
Bartholomaeus writes that dogs “loueþ here lordes and defendeþ þe 
houses of here lordes; and putteþ hem willfulliche in peril of deþ for here 
lordes. . . . And loueþ company of men and moue nouʒte be wiþouten 
men. . . . We haue conceyued þat houndes faught for here lordes aʒens 
þeues and weren sore ywounded; and þat þay kepeþ away bestes and 
foules from here ded lordes body; and þat a hound compellid þe sleer of 
his lord wiþ berkynge and bytynge to knowleche his trespas and gilt” 
(1165). Similar observations are found throughout the bestiary tradition, 
usually followed by several detailed examples of dogs showing 
unceasing devotion even after their masters’ deaths. 
Among all animals, domestic or wild, dogs are particularly noted 
for their intelligence. Hunting manuals such as Edward of Norwich’s The 
Master of Game describe the dog as a creature “of greet vndirstondynge 
and of greet knowynge” and “the moost reasonable beest and beste 
knowynge of eny beest that evere God made” (44). Bartholomaeus 
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proclaims that “noþyng is more busy and witty þan þe hound for he haþ 
more witte þan oþer bestes” (1165), a statement also echoed in the 
Aberdeen Bestiary, which adds that the dog alone among other animals 
knows its name (fol. 18r). Medieval writers even granted dogs a degree 
of reason and discernment: 
 
When a dog picks up the track of a hare or a deer and comes to a 
place where the trail divides or to a junction splitting into several 
directions, it goes to the beginning of each path and silently 
reasons with itself, as if by syllogism, on the basis of its keen 
sense of smell. “Either the animal went off in this direction,” it 
says, “or that, or certainly it took this turning.” (Aberdeen 
Bestiary, fol. 18v) 
 
Indeed, in some medieval law codes dogs were perceived to have 
sufficient powers of independent judgment that an owner might be 
partially relieved of liability should the dog commit a crime. For 
example, while according to the laws of the Alamans the owner was 
responsible for the entire wergild should a horse, pig, or ox kill a man, if 
a dog killed a man the owner would be responsible for only half the 
wergild (Rivers 54-55).
8
 Salisbury suggests that such legislation may 
indicate the perception that dogs had the capacity for individual agency, 
beyond their owner’s responsibility (30). For all that humans are 
supposed to be the only ones among God’s creatures endowed with 
reason, medieval people still seem to attribute at least some degree of 
rational capacity to dogs.  
This is not to say that dogs in the Middle Ages are universally 
presented as unambiguous paragons of virtue—they, too, can be 
susceptible to lechery and gluttony, for example. Bartholomaeus 
concludes his lengthy entry on dogs with a somewhat grudging 
acknowledgement of their less virtuous qualities: 
 
Houndes haueþ oþere propretees þat beeþ nought ful goode: for 
houndes haueþ continual bolysme, þat is ‘immoderate appetit,’ 
and beþ somtyme so punyshed wiþ hunger þat þay waxeþ 
rabbissh and woode. . . . Also he is to couetous and glotoun and 
eteþ þerfore ofte careynes so glotounliche þat he brakeþ and 
casteþ it vp. But afterward whanne he is anhungred he takeþ þat 
he hadde ycast vp in foul manere. . . . Also he is vnclene and 
leccherous. Aristotle seiþ þat houndes boþe male and female vseþ 
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leccherie as longe as þay ben on lyue. And ʒiueþ hem to 
vnclennesse of lecchery þat þay takeþ no dyuersite bytwene 
moder and suster and oþere bicches, touchinge þe dede of 
leccherie. (1169-70) 
 
In fables and in exegetical texts, which were more interested in exploring 
animals as human exemplars, we tend to find more pronounced emphasis 
on the negative characteristics of dogs. Nevertheless the contrast between 
dogs and wolves remains acute, and in the bestiary tradition, as well as in 
encyclopedic texts such as Bartholomaeus’, the positive characteristics of 
dogs are given far more emphasis.
9
  
When we first see the werewolf in Marie’s lai, it is hardly behaving 
like the ravenous and blood-thirsty wolf of the bestiary tradition, or 
Marie’s wild, all-devouring garvalf. Although Bisclavret admits to his 
wife that when in wolf form, “En cele grant forest me met, / Al plus 
espés de la gaudine, / S’i vif  de preie e de ravine” [“I go into that great 
forest, / to the deepest part of the woods, / and live on prey and plunder”] 
(63-66), we do not hear of or see any of the intense, mindless violence 
ascribed to the garvulf. As Robyn A. Holman points out, this is very 
different from Melion, one of the lai’s close analogues, in which the 
werewolf routinely butchers livestock and becomes the leader of a 
murderous pack of wolves (4). On the contrary, Marie’s werewolf 
exhibits the gentle demeanor and perspicacity of the dog. When the 
king’s hounds encounter Bisclavret in the forest while hunting, the 
werewolf rushes to the king and makes a gesture of submission: 
 
Vers lui curut quere merci.   
Il l’aveit pris par sun estrié,   
La jambe li baise e le pié.  (146-48) 
 
it ran to him to ask mercy. 
It took him by the stirrup, 
it kisses his leg and his foot. 
 
Bisclavret’s intelligence and discernment are immediately noted by the 
king:  
 
“Seignurs,” fet il, “avant venez!    
Ceste merveillë esgardez, 
Cum ceste beste se humilie!    
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Ele ad sen de hume, merci crie.    
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Ceste beste ad entente e sen.” (151-55, 157) 
  
“Lords,” he said, “come here at once! 
Look at this wonder, 
how this beast humbles itself! 
It has human understanding, it begs mercy. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
This beast has intelligence and understanding.” 
 
The king’s assessment is reiterated by Marie’s narrator, who asserts that 
the wolf Bisclavret “esteit franc e deboniere, / Unques ne volt a rien 
mesfeire” [“was so noble and kind, / it never wished to do wrong in any 
way”] (179-80). Moreover, the use of “entente” in line 157 and “volt” in 
line 180 imply will and agency, which are dependent upon some degree 
of cognitive judgment. By exhibiting gentility, meekness, and rational 
discernment, Bisclavret marks himself as dog rather than wolf and elicits 
the corresponding response from the king and his court, leading them to 
conclude that when the wolf breaks out into uncharacteristic violence 
against Bisclavret’s former wife he must have good reason (240-50).  
To be sure, one might object that Bisclavret’s behavior is more 
human than animal. Scholars have noted the ways in which the 
werewolf’s initial approach to its king mimics the act of homage, and this 
is usually the primary instance presented as evidence of the man trapped 
inside the wolf (Sconduto 45). However, while we may indeed read this 
moment as a human demonstration of fealty evoking the rites of homage, 
Crane reminds us that it is equally evocative of dog behavior: 
 
Surrounded as he is by hunting dogs, the cross-species template 
for his wolfish kisses might resonate as strongly with the animals 
as with the human. That is, it seems as plausible that one of the 
king’s dogs might lick his foot as that one of his huntsman might 
kiss it. To the extent that the werewolf’s gestures recall a dog’s, 
they are not evidently due to the “mind of a man.” (59) 
 
Once we acknowledge the parallels with animal behavior, we open up 
new avenues for exploring the potential significance of the lai’s events. 
 Because so many readers have read Bisclavret’s behavior through a 
purely human lens, interpretations of the werewolf tearing the nose from 
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his wife’s face have also focused entirely on its significance in human 
terms. The standard explanation is that cutting off the nose was a 
punishment for a number of crimes, but typically adultery (Burgess 104, 
Rothschild 135 n. 115). Though Bruckner questions whether this was 
true outside of folklore, finding no mention of such punishment in 
medieval feudal or canon law (262), Valentin Groebner cites frequent 
mention of nose-cutting for private vengeance for sexual infidelity in the 
judicial records of Nuremberg from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
(72). That would certainly seem to fit here, as after the wife learns of her 
husband’s lycanthropy she takes up with the knight she has enlisted to 
hide the clothing by which Bisclavret effects his transformation. That the 
wife’s disfigurement is “strikingly similar to the effects of leprosy” 
(Sayers 82) suggests another link to the crime of adultery, for leprosy 
was considered to be a marker of “carnality, unbridled lust, even moral 
depravity” (Holten 199). Intriguingly, this suggests yet another 
connection between the wife’s punishment and her own wolfish 
behavior; synthesizing arguments by Katheryn Holten and William 
Sayers, Leslie Dunton-Downer explains that “the tearing off of the nose 
makes the wife, as figurative lupa, look like a lepra and exposes her 
bestial nature” (209). Moreover, as a monstrous-seeming woman without 
a nose, the wife would presumably be less likely to perpetuate her crime 
again in the future. 
Yet to insist upon the noselessness as a punishment for a 
specifically sexual transgression falls somewhat short of the mark in 
Marie’s lai, for adultery does not seem to encompass the totality of the 
wife’s betrayal. For all that Groebner’s brief synopsis of the lai asserts 
that Bisclavret’s “unfaithful wife maliciously bans him to his animal 
form in order to live with her lover” (75), Marie makes it quite clear that 
the wife had no interest in the knight who sought her love: “Ele ne l’aveit 
unc amé / Ne de s’amur aseüré” [“she had never loved him / or promised 
him her love”] (107-08). Only after she has decided to take advantage of 
the knight’s devotion to her to get rid of her husband does she accept his 
advances. Moreover, Bisclavret’s wife does not merely abandon her 
husband for another, but rather betrays her husband’s trust and his 
deepest secret and condemns him to remain in his wolf form. One might 
simply argue that her punishment marks her more broadly as a traitor, 
and indeed M. Faure makes a brief note asserting that desnatio was a 
punishment reserved for traitors in the chanson de geste (355), though he 
does not elaborate on this point. Nevertheless, we are no closer to 
understanding why noselessness is an appropriate fate for Bisclavret’s 
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wife, or why the nose is a fitting target for Bisclavret’s canine rage. 
Though Bruckner claims that “[Bisclavret’s] rage is not that of the 
werewolf; it is the understandably human and feudal desire for 
vengeance, the appropriate punishment of his wife’s betrayal” (262), it is 
only if we see the nose from the dog’s perspective that its 
appropriateness truly becomes evident. 
Both medieval and modern people recognize that dogs privilege 
their sense of smell. In the epigraph that begins this essay, Gerald of 
Wales notes the way that dogs depend more on their noses than on their 
eyes and will use scent to confirm what they see, “as if nature had placed 
all the powers of infallibility in that feature” (130). Edward of Norwich 
also implies a connection between the dog’s intelligence and its sense of 
smell: “an hounde hath greet mynde and greet smelling” (44). In our own 
era, Cesar Millan, a keen observer of dog behavior and star of National 
Geographic’s wildly popular show The Dog Whisperer, continually 
reminds his clients that whereas humans privilege first our mouths and 
ears for communication and then the eyes, with the nose and its sense of 
smell so attenuated as to be virtually meaningless, dogs privilege the 
sense organs in the opposite order (Millan 93). Modern science confirms 
that, in contrast with humans, the nose is the dog’s primary tool for 
communication; dogs not only have multiple sensory systems devoted to 
olfaction but also have 220 million to 2 billion olfactory neurons in 
comparison to a paltry 12-40 million in humans (Miklósi 144). Thus, for 
a dog, “his nose not only dominates his face, it also dominates his brain 
and thus his picture of the world. Human brains are predominantly 
shaped and structured around vision and processing light-related data, but 
the dog’s brain is built around the information it gets from scents” (Coren 
50).  
Reliance upon scent is of course true for all canines, yet perhaps 
even more so for domesticated dogs. Ethologists John Bradshaw and 
Helen Nott attest that while both wolves and dogs use a variety of visual 
communication methods, dogs seem to rely on them less than their wild 
ancestors do, in large part because “selection by humans for certain 
morphological characters has reduced some dogs’ abilities to use certain 
structures for visual communication” (119).10 Human preferences for 
neotenic traits such as smaller noses and mouths, most vividly 
exemplified in the flattened muzzles of the modern pug, “may in fact 
have shaped select breeds’ capacities to communicate through nonverbal 
cues, with profound perceptual and relational consequences” 
(Woodward, Milliken, and Humy 238). Such breeds are incapable of 
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performing more than a small fraction of the visual signals produced by 
wolves (Bradshaw and Nott 119). As a result, between dogs of different 
breeds “visual communication appears to play little part in many 
interactions,” possibly because “modification of their signaling 
structures” has produced “incompatible visual signals” (Bradshaw and 
Nott 125). In other words, social cues conveyed by body language in 
general, but particularly facial expressions, have been blunted to some 
degree in domesticated canines, leaving them more dependent than their 
wild cousins upon scent for their knowledge of their social world.  
It is difficult to overemphasize the degree to which dogs rely on 
scent for social communication. Among the most important scents are 
pheromones, which not only convey information about sexual readiness 
but a host of other kinds of information as well, including emotional 
state. As Stanley Coren explains, “Reading pheromone scents is, for the 
dog, the equivalent of reading a written message about the status and 
feelings of another animal” (60). This may serve an important 
evolutionary purpose as well: “For social animals like dogs , , ,  knowing 
the emotional state of his companions might increase the chances of 
survival of the whole pack” (Coren 61). This is equally true in domestic 
environments, for “dogs that live in the same household will sniff each 
other frequently to get a quick update on how their housemate is feeling 
today and advance warning of any negative or aggressive feelings” (62). 
The nose is the primary means by which the dog knows who is friend and 
who is foe. 
Though humans have evolved to have a greater reliance on sight 
than on scent, the persistence of the nose as a metaphor for knowing (to 
sniff out the truth, plain as the nose on one’s face) suggests our 
continuing, implicit recognition of the significance of scent and the 
insights the nose can provide. This may at least partially account for 
Gregory the Great’s explication, in his Book of Pastoral Rule, of the nose 
as a symbol of discernment “whereby we elect virtue and reject sin” (45). 
Thinking of the nose as an instrument of knowing is the key to 
understanding its significance in Bisclavret. Dunton-Downer makes the 
tantalizing suggestion that Marie is playing on the Old French idiom 
“n’avoir point du nez,” which means to be unreasonable or to lack good 
sense (209). The wife’s noselessness signifies her failure to perceive the 
truth of her husband’s character. In biting off his wife’s nose, Bisclavret 
makes visible and literal her failure of perception and judgment: she was 
too caught up in surface appearances to recognize that no matter his 
outward appearance, her husband was the same as he ever was. 
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Noselessness makes the wife’s error of discernment visible, providing a 
way for other humans to “read” the wife’s treacherous nature. 
For Dunton-Downer, the idiomatic connection she notes is evidence 
that the wife’s punishment is poetic and thus inherently human: “The 
poetic nature of the act (i.e., its ipseity, that no other act or body part 
would mean as much or as well as the nose) is the supreme sign of the 
wolf’s humanness and of his possession of a self, a linguistic interiority 
(209). Poetic, yes—but also supremely canine, for in depriving his wife 
of her nose, Bisclavret has rendered his wife dependent solely upon sight 
and sound, those senses most vulnerable to deception by others. 
Bisclaveret’s wife can now rely only on more fallible human means of 
discerning truth. This is a contrapasso of which Dante would be proud, 
in which the figurative nature of the wife’s sin, her failure to perceive 
and act on truth correctly, is made concrete and literal. The wife’s 
noselessness thus marks her outwardly as evil at the same time that it 
deprives her of the instrument—metaphorical for humans, literal for 
canines—which would allow her to recognize evil intent in others. In 
canine terms, Bisclavret’s vengeance is complete. 
Whether dogs actually possess a concept of vengeance is difficult if 
not impossible to determine. In her recent article, Emma Campbell seems 
to suggest that what denotes Bisclavret’s violence as human is its 
rational, avenging impetus, whereas animal violence is mere mindless 
savagery (100). Medieval people however, appear to have had no trouble 
attributing desire for revenge to dogs. In one of the most famous 
passages in the bestiary tradition, recounted as well by Ambrose of Milan 
and Gerald of Wales, a dog whose master has been murdered later attacks 
the perpetrator to exact its vengeance: 
 
It happened that the man who had committed the crime, acting 
confidently in order to convince people of his innocence—such is 
the cunning way in which men think—joined the circle of 
onlookers and, feigning grief, approached the corpse. Then the 
dog, briefly abandoning its doleful lament, took up the arms of 
vengeance, seized the man and held him. (Aberdeen Bestiary, fol. 
19r-19v) 
 
Like Bisclavret’s king and his court, the onlookers conclude that the dog 
must have just cause. When the murderer can offer no evidence in his 
defense, he is punished based on the dog’s mute testimony alone, and the 
dog obtains his vengeance.   
Langdon                                                     61 
 
In Marie’s lais animals have much to teach humans, and it is no 
different here. The king’s advisor has learned from the wolf how to read 
others properly, based on evidence of character rather than appearance, 
and it is he who finally makes the logical connection between the knight 
who had disappeared and the wolf’s behavior toward the missing 
knight’s wife: 
 
“Ceo est la femme al chevaler 
Que taunt par suliez aveir chier, 
Que lung tens ad esté perduz; 
Ne seümes qu’est devenuz. 
Kar metez la dame en destreit, 
S’aucune chose vus direit, 
Pur quei ceste beste la heit; 
Fetes li dire se ele le seit!” (251-58) 
 
“This is the wife of the knight 
whom you used to hold so dear,  
who has been missing for a long time; 
we never knew what became of him. 
Put the lady under duress about this, 
to see if she will tell you anything 
about why this beast hates her; 
make her tell it if she knows!” 
 
Bisclavret has taught the king and his advisor how to read beyond the 
wife’s fair appearance and courteous words, revealing her as the traitor 
she is. The canine teaches the court, and the lai teaches us, not to rely 
solely on such fallible means of discerning truth. 
Dogs cannot, of course, teach us to rely on scent as they do. If in 
our evolutionary history humans ever possessed such an ability, we lost it 
once we began to privilege other senses (Wang and Tedford 86). Yet 
given our overwhelming dependence upon verbal language, dogs provide 
us with an essential reminder that words are not enough, and interacting 
with dogs may even help us improve other forms of social 
communication. Citing a study of German adolescents that found that pet 
owners were more skilled at decoding human, non-verbal facial 
expressions than those who did not have extensive interactions with 
nonhuman animals, behavior scientist Lynette Hart suggests that “the 
experience of talking and playing with a pet, especially a dog, may 
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educate a child in some of the subtleties of social relationships” (167). 
Observing our canine companions closely can help us learn to read each 
other better, to know as the dog knows. 
 
Western Kentucky University  
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                                                  Notes 
 
An earlier version of this essay was presented at the International 
Medieval Congress annual meeting in Kalamazoo, MI on May 13, 2010. 
I wish to thank Jennifer Walton-Hanley and Marijane Osborn for their 
helpful suggestions. 
 
 
1
 The Aberdeen Bestiary provides an excellent example of the 
ways that animal behavior may be read allegorically: 
 
In some ways preachers are like dogs: by their admonitions and 
righteous ways they are always driving off the ambushes laid by 
the Devil, lest he seize and carry off God's treasure— Christian 
souls. As the dog's tongue, licking a wound, heals it, the wounds 
of sinners, laid bare in confession, are cleansed by the correction 
of the priest. As the dog's tongue heals man's internal wounds, 
the secrets of his heart are often purified by the deeds and 
discourse of the Church's teachers. As the dog is said to be 
temperate in its ways, the man who is set over others diligently 
studies wisdom and must avoid drunkenness and gluttony in 
every way, for Sodom perished in a surfeit of food. Indeed, 
there is no quicker way for the Devil, his enemy, to take 
possession of man than through his greedy gullet. The dog 
returning to its vomit signifies those who, after making their 
confession, heedlessly return to wrongdoing. The dog leaving its 
meat behind in the river, out of desire for its shadow, signifies 
foolish men who often forsake what is theirs by right out of 
desire for some unknown object; with the result that, while they 
are unable to obtain the object of their desire, they needlessly 
lose what they have given up. (fol. 19v-20r) 
 
2
       And as I wente, ther cam by mee 
A whelp, that fauned me as I stood, 
That hadde yfolowed and koude no good. 
Hyt com and crepte to me as lowe 
Ryght as hyt hadde me yknowe, 
Helde doun hys hed and joyned hys eres, 
And leyde al smothe doun hys heres. (388-94) 
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For two excellent articles that focus on Chaucer’s figure of the whelp in 
The Book of the Duchess, see John Block Friedman, "The Dreamer, the 
Whelp, and Consolation in the Book of the Duchess," Chaucer Review 3 
(1969), 145-62, and Carol Falvo Heffernan, “That Dog Again: 
Melancholia Canina and Chaucer’s Book of the Duchess,” Modern 
Philology 84.2 (1986), 185-90. 
3
 See, for example, Bartholomaeus’ comment that “þe cruelnesse of 
an hound abateþ if a man sitteþ on grounde” (1166), an observation 
echoed in trainers’ advice on how to calm a fearful dog. 
4
 In particular, Crane also notes the parallels between Bisclavret’s 
behavior and that of dogs in the bestiary tradition, which I will discuss 
later in this essay. 
5
 Throughout this essay I use the term canine to refer to the genus 
that includes both wolves and dogs, using the latter terms to differentiate 
between wild and domestic canines. 
6
 For Marie’s Anglo-Norman text, I am using Ewert’s edition.  The 
Modern English translation is that of Claire Waters. 
7
 Noting the same similarities between the werewolf Bisclavret and 
the characterization of dogs as opposed to wolves in the medieval 
bestiary tradition, Crane speculates that Marie may have taken inspiration 
from such texts: “Marie’s work shares enough detail with the bestiaries’ 
juxtaposition of wolf, dog, and man that it seems possible she consulted a 
bestiary manuscript” (68). As Ménard suggests (177), it may be that in 
order to make her werewolf protagonist sympathetic Marie had no choice 
other than to give him qualities more doglike than wolf-like, at least 
according to how each animal was characterized by medieval writers. 
8
 Dogs might even be tried on the same terms as their human 
owners, receiving the same punishment (Pluskowski 86). See also Vitale 
Huhn, "Löwe und Hund als Symbole des Rechts." Mainfrankisches 
Jahrbuch fur Geschichte und Kunst 7 (1955): 1-63. 
9
 This seems to be true in general of those texts that largely seek to 
describe dogs as living creatures, rather than merely as figurative 
exemplars of human virtues or vices. In fables such as Marie’s “The Dog 
and the Cheese” or “The Dog and the Sheep” and in exegetical texts such 
as the Fasciculus Morum, dogs are more likely to be portrayed 
negatively, particularly as allegorical representations of folly or gluttony. 
See Salisbury 133-34 and Pluskowski 85-89.  
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10
 The difficulty of reading facial cues is further compounded by 
contemporary aesthetics concerning dogs, as “human preferences for 
certain dog phenotypes (for example, docked tails and ears) may in fact 
have shaped select breeds’ capacities to communicate through nonverbal 
cues, with profound perceptual and relational consequences” 
(Woodward, Milliken, and Humy 238). This is already true of toy dogs in 
the classical Roman period, bred to retain neotenic characteristics such as 
smaller noses and mouths (Salisbury 116). 
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